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Same-Sex Marriage and Polygamy:
A Non-Traditional Pairing
By David Lake*

I. Introduction

“

Organized chaos” is perhaps the best term to describe the scene.
Roughly 12,000 angry–yet peaceful–protestors converged on
Los Angeles City Hall in November of 2008, only a few days
after voters approved Proposition 8.1 They brandished signs declaring “No on Hate,” or “No More Mr. Nice Gay.” Passage of the highly
controversial proposition officially made homosexual marriage illegal in the State of California. Many voters felt that marriage should
only be permitted between one man and one woman, while others
believed that such ideology is discriminatory; “I hope that it shows
there are a lot more people affected by the choices we make on a ballot,” said Christine Pease, a protestor in Los Angeles.2 Although the
proposition brought the issue to a head in California, the controversy
was anything but new.
In April of that same year, just a few months prior to Proposition 8, a group of women shed tears as they spoke with reporters.
The women were part of a polygamist sect in western Texas, and
federal authorities raided their religious compound and had taken
their children. Photos of crying mothers appeared in the New York
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Times, causing many Americans to wonder if the raid was morally
justifiable. “I’m not going to just sit and wait,” said one of the mothers. “I have to do something every day to let them know that I want
my children back.”3
The two scenarios may seem disconnected; however, they both
display the controversy surrounding different forms of non-traditional marriage. Support for one of these non-traditional forms of
marriage may be greater than another, but modern culture’s understanding of “traditional” marriage appears to be changing. This article does not seek to advocate one form of marriage over another,
or even to argue the moral correctness of either, but rather to establish the legal relationship between same-sex marriage and polygamy. The inherent characteristics and legal implications of these two
forms of non-traditional marriage are similar. It follows, then, that
if same-sex marriage is determined to be legal, polygamy should
be legalized as well. Likewise, if polygamy is outlawed, same-sex
marriage must be also. The two institutions are conjoined, and legal
decisions concerning one will likely have ramifications for the other.

II. The Nature of Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Marriages

Even within the homosexual community, the connections between polygamy and homosexual marriage are recognized. In July
of 2006, an organization called Beyond Marriage issued a statement on rights for the Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender (LGBT)
community,4 which was subsequently signed by several hundred
people including university professors, labor union leaders, attor-
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neys, and activists.5 The statement outlines the political agenda of
the organization, which is essentially to “respond to the full scope of
the conservative marriage agenda.”6 The treatise declares that there
are other family relationships beyond “traditional nuclear families”
that are worthy of legal recognition, and that traditional marriages
“should not be legally…privileged above all others.”7 Among other
relationships, the statement notes that “households in which there is
more than one conjugal partner” are household relationships worthy
and deserving of legal recognition.8 Many proponents of same-sex
marriage recognize the similarity between polygamous and homosexual marriages and feel that both need to be advocated if either is
to be legalized.
To fully comprehend the similarities between polygamy and homosexual marriage, an understanding of how the two differ from
traditional marriage is necessary. Marriage, as it is traditionally understood in Western civilization, is a legal union between one man and
one woman, in which they form a family by becoming husband and
wife. Robert P. George, a professor of politics at Princeton University
and prolific author on marriage, delivered a forum address at Brigham
Young University on October 28, 2008 entitled, “On the Moral Purposes of Law and Government.”9 In the address, George said, “Marriage is a pre-political form of association, what we might call a natural
institution. It is not created by law, though law recognizes and regulates it in every culture.”10 Traditional marriage pre-dates politics and
thus, according to George, is natural to the human character.
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The union of marriage, George explains, is both emotional and
physical. In a marriage, the individuals express affection for one
another, as well as “permanence, monogamy, and fidelity.”11 Thus,
they become united emotionally. There is also a physical aspect.
As George explains, what makes marriage “different from all other forms of friendship and sharing, is the sharing is founded upon
bodily communion… Bodily union [is] made possible by the sexual
complementarity of man and woman.”12 By uniting both physically
and emotionally, the individuals in a marriage can become “one.”
Unions such as gay marriage and polygamy both seem capable
of fulfilling the emotional union required of marriage. Proponents
for the legalization of gay marriage argue that love is all that is needed for a marriage, and that homosexuals qualify for legal recognition of marriage rights. When speaking of marriage as an emotional
union, George states, “By this definition, two people of the same sex
can be emotionally united, but by the same token so can three or five
or seven.”13 Thus, the emotional connection in marriage (i.e. that of
expressing affection, permanence, fidelity, etc.) can be achieved in
both homosexual and polygamous marriages.
As noted previously, the physical aspect distinguishes traditional marriage from close friendships and non-traditional marriages.
According to George, “bodily communion” differentiates marriage
from friendship and sharing. “Two people can unite as a reproductive unit,” George explains, “but that’s not something three people or
five people do.”14 In a traditional marriage, the physical complementarity of husband and wife allow them to fulfill the physical aspect
of marriage and potentially form a family. Reproduction is a twoperson act, only possible between one man and one woman. Thus,
polygamy and gay marriage differ from traditional marriage in that
they fail to meet the physical criteria of having the potential to reproduce through bodily communion. Two individuals of the same
11
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gender are not physically complementary and do not have the potential to reproduce. Likewise, only two people can be involved in
the physical act of reproduction. Consequently, polygamous relationships fail to meet the physical criteria as well.
In order to be a “traditional marriage,” the union must meet both
the physical and emotional requirements outlined by George. If a
marriage does not fulfill both of these requirements, it is not traditional. The inherent characteristics of same-sex marriage and polygamy are similar, and the two can be considered connected. They
both fail to fulfill the physical aspect of traditional marriage because
individuals in these marriages are not physically complementary and
cannot form a reproductive unit. Proponents of same-sex marriage
advocate the idea that an emotional connection is all that is needed
for a marriage to be valid, and polygamous marriages fulfill the emotional aspect of marriage as well. Therefore, if such is the case, then
polygamy is as viable a form of marriage as is same-sex marriage.

III. The Reynolds Decision: Defining Tradition
In 1878, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that anti-polygamy
laws were constitutional, and that polygamy was not a viable form
of marriage.15 George Reynolds lived in the Utah Territory and was
a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which,
at the time, encouraged polygamous marriages. Polygamy, however,
was considered a crime.16 Feeling that the anti-polygamy laws violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religion, Reynolds
appealed his case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided
that the law prohibiting polygamy was, in fact, constitutional. The
Court stated that a party’s “religious belief cannot be accepted as a
justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land.”17
Although polygamy was part of Reynolds’ religion, he was not justified in breaking the law that criminalized this non-traditional form
of marriage.
15
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In his opinion, Chief Justice Waite describes part of the reason
why the statute prohibiting polygamy was constitutional. He explains,
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe…At common law, the second
marriage was always void…and from the earliest history of
England polygamy has been treated as an offence against
society…It may safely be said there never has been a time
in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an
offence against society.18
According to the Supreme Court, polygamy has always been seen
as an offense in Western civilization, especially in the United States
and under English common law. Chief Justice Waite implies that the
United States’ traditional abhorrence of polygamy derives from the
English tradition of the same. Thus, according to Reynolds v. United
States, laws prohibiting certain forms of marriage because they are
non-traditional are perfectly within the realm of the Constitution.
Polygamy was traditionally outlawed and “odious,” and therefore the
court was justified in upholding a law that criminalized it.
Although the law outlawing polygamy was upheld, the Reynolds decision presented a dilemma concerning homosexual marriage
laws. If laws prohibiting a form of non-traditional marriage, such
as polygamy, are constitutional because they are based on tradition,
then what does that mean for other forms of non-traditional unions,
such as homosexual marriage? As outlined by the previously noted
criteria, homosexual marriages do not fit the definition of traditional marriage. Reynolds v. United States set a precedent in declaring
that laws prohibiting non-traditional marriages are constitutional
if they are based on tradition, and the continuation of such ideas
has been seen recently in the raid on the aforementioned polygamist compound in Texas. Reynolds declared the criminalization of
polygamy to be constitutional, and set a precedent that continues
today for homosexual marriage as well. Consequently, laws prohibiting homosexual marriage are constitutional as long as the Reynolds
decision stands. If homosexual marriage is declared to be constitu18
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tional by the Supreme Court under the right to privacy and the “traditional marriage” argument is voided, then they may also overturn
Reynolds and legalize polygamy by default. This could be remedied,
however, if the court explicitly states that the marriage can only be
between two people.

IV. The Development of Privacy and the Erosion of Reynolds
Among the many arguments in favor of same-sex marriage, one
of the strongest is the issue of privacy. Supreme Court precedent
has established that whatever consenting adults do behind closed
doors is protected by the right to privacy.19 Proponents of same-sex
marriage infer the right to marry from the right to have an intimate
relationship without state intervention, as established through the development of the right to privacy in court cases such as Griswold v.
Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas. In Justice Scalia’s
opinion for Lawrence v. Texas, establishing that consenting adults
have a right to privacy in their own homes, he states, “Today’s approach to stare decisis invites us to overrule an erroneously decided
precedent…if…its foundations have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent
decisions.”20 Therefore, as the argument for same-sex marriage has
been strengthened by the development of privacy rights, Reynolds v.
United States has been “eroded” away.
Griswold v. Connecticut established that the right to privacy exists in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,21 although it is not specifically enumerated.22 From the Griswold decision came the Roe v.
Wade and Lawrence v. Texas decisions. In the opinion of the court
on the Lawrence case, Justice Kennedy stated, “The most pertinent
beginning point [for the Lawrence decision] is our decision in Gris-
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wold v. Connecticut.”23 Thus, Griswold was the starting point for
the development of privacy rights that are now making way for the
legalization of same-sex marriage.
After Griswold v. Connecticut established that the right to privacy was implicit in the Bill of Rights, several other cases began to
emerge that defined the extent to which privacy is implied. In December of 1971, the Supreme Court reached a decision on Roe v. Wade.24
The Roe decision established a woman’s right to abort a pregnancy,
and laws prohibiting abortions were declared unconstitutional. In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that the
Texas laws prohibiting abortion “were unconstitutionally vague and
that they abridged [Roe’s] right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”25 Thus,
the Court reinforced the jurisprudence established in Griswold by
reiterating that the right to privacy is implicitly found in the Bill
of Rights and that the right to privacy includes sexual decisions. In
speaking of a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, Justice Blackmun stated, “Appellant would discover this right in the concept of
personal “liberty” embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy
said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras.”26 Therefore, the Court recognized that the right to privacy includes the right
to terminate a pregnancy, and likewise the Bill of Rights protects the
rights to “personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy.”27 To emphasize this idea, Justice Blackmun later explained that prior cases
establishing the right to privacy “also make it clear that the right has
some extension to activities relating to marriage,…procreation,…
contraception, …[and] family relationships,”28 so the constitutional
right to privacy protects sexual and marital choices.
23
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As the right to privacy has developed through the Supreme
Court, so has the argument for same-sex relationships. After Griswold and Roe established a right to sexual privacy, Lawrence v. Texas emerged in the Supreme Court in 2003. In this case, the Court
found that a Texas law forbidding “two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct” was unconstitutional.29
The Court decided that if the act is consensual, then the government cannot intervene. In declaring the Texas law to be a violation
of the right to privacy, the court “placed emphasis on the marriage
relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom.”30 According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution shields whatever sexual
choices consenting adults make and creates the “marital bedroom”
as a private, protected area. In making this decision, the court declared, “Our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most
relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”31 Thus,
consenting adults can make whatever sexual choices they want, regardless of sexual preference. The court decisions and traditions of
the past fifty years, essentially beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, were deemed the most applicable in the case.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia makes several points
about the Lawrence decision that, at times, seem to echo the wording
of Reynolds v. United States. He states,
Our Nation has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting
sodomy in general–regardless of whether it was performed
by same-sex or opposite-sex couples… Proscriptions against
that conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights.32
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Thus, Justice Scalia argues that sodomy has traditionally been prohibited by law. Such laws, he claims, “have ancient roots.” Sodomy
was prohibited by English common law, which created a tradition for
American laws. All of the original thirteen States had laws against
sodomy when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Tradition, Scalia argues, is why sodomy should not be legalized.
If Lawrence v. Texas allows for same-gender sexual activity,
such as sodomy, in spite of a long-standing tradition of laws against
it, then what effect does that potentially have on other non-traditional sexual activities? Justice Scalia recognizes the potential snowball
effect that the Lawrence decision could have. He says,
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity… Every single one of these laws is called into
question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.33
If the Supreme Court permits non-traditional sexual and marital activities such as sodomy, which is protected by the right to privacy,
then the door may possibly open for other private, sexual acts as
well. The same right to privacy that legalized sodomy also extends
to “activities relating to marriage,” according to Roe v. Wade.34 If
the law permits same-sex couples to participate in certain sexual activities, and protects the privacy “of the marital bedroom,”35 then the
legalization of same-sex marriage is logically the next step. Justice
Scalia recognizes that laws against polygamy and same-sex marriage are called into question by the Lawrence decision.
Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence have all developed the right to
marital and sexual privacy, and the development of the right to privacy paves the road for same-sex marriage. With the development
of the right to privacy in the marital bedroom, laws concerning traditional marriage have been overruled and redefined. These decisions imply a change from the traditional laws regarding marriage
33
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and sex, especially in the case of Lawrence. As Justice Scalia notes,
Lawrence v. Texas was decided in spite of legal tradition. Tradition,
however, compels the Supreme Court to declare anti-polygamy laws
constitutional in the Reynolds case. Consequently, if one form of nontraditional marriage is legalized, what does that mean for Reynolds
v. United States? As previously stated, Justice Scalia explains that
the Lawrence decision shows that a previous case can be overruled if
“its foundations have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent decisions.”36 The
Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence decisions have all eroded the foundations of Reynolds v. United States by ruling against tradition. If the
privacy cases eventually lead to a legalization of same-sex marriage,
then Reynolds will be eroded to the point that it will essentially have
been overruled. If one form of non-traditional marriage is permitted
in spite of long-standing legal tradition, then the other will need to
be permitted as well.

V. Canada: An Example of Things to Come?
As American society becomes more comfortable with the idea
of same-sex marriage, legislation and state court decisions are beginning to favor it. As of March 1, 2010, eleven states have either
legalized same-sex marriage or recognized a form of civil union or

36
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domestic partnership.37 How much time will pass until a Supreme
Court decision is handed down, and same-sex marriage is deemed
constitutional across the country? Once this happens, polygamy
laws are likely to follow suit.
This trend is already evident in Canada. Recently, in the case of
Blackmore v. British Columbia,38 a leader of a polygamous sect was
charged with marrying 19 women. According to his lawyer, their defense was based on the fact that Canada legalized same-sex marriage
in 2005.39 Blair Suffredine, former provincial lawmaker and Blackmore’s attorney in the case, stated, “If (homosexuals) can marry,
what is the reason that public policy says one person can’t marry
more than one person?”40 According to the British Columbia Attorney General, this case had the potential to be the first test of Canada’s polygamy laws.41 In September of 2009, this case was dismissed
on a technicality concerning the appointment of a special prosecutor,
and the court made clear that the case dismissal “[had] nothing to
37
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do with the merits of the alleged offences.” Thus, the court did not
make a decision on the polygamy charges, leaving the door open for
future interpretation.
Although about 85 percent of Canadians oppose the legalization
of polygamy,42 Blackmore’s defense was not as far-fetched as many
may believe. If people oppose polygamy and support same-sex marriage, their opinion is legally inconsistent. In 2006, Canada’s federal
Justice Department issued a report urging lawmakers in Ottawa to
legalize polygamy.43 According to the Canadian Press, the study was
“intended to provide the Liberal government with ammunition to
help defend its same-sex marriage bill,” which was passed in 2005.44
Although lawmakers in Canada have not followed the advice of the
Justice Department as of yet, Canadian governmental leaders seem
to recognize the legal connection between same-sex marriage and
polygamy. Clearly, Canada is a sovereign nation distinct from the
United States, but it is still a developed, Western, North American
nation that shares many of the same traditions and values of the
United States. If the legalization of same-sex marriage has opened
the door for the decriminalization of polygamy in Canada, who is to
say that the United States should be any different? Whether polygamy will be decriminalized in Canada following their legalization
of same-sex marriage remains to be seen, but the possibility is there
and is already presenting itself.

VI. Conclusion
The connection between same-sex marriage and polygamy is
an idea that some Americans have yet to consider. Many who have
examined it, however, may still dismiss it as a slippery-slope argu42
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ment and pay it no heed.45 Nonetheless, the connection between the
two exists, and the possibility of legalizing both is real. As traditional marriage is redefined in the minds of Americans in favor of
same-sex marriage, legal decisions are opening doors for polygamy
as well. The argument for same-sex marriage has been strengthened
by the development of privacy rights over the last 50 years. As privacy rights, including sexual and marital rights, have been strengthened and redefined, the foundation of Reynolds v. United States has
eroded away. Thus, as the argument for same-sex marriage has developed, the possibility of legalizing polygamy has become more
tangible. It is still possible that the Supreme Court will not permit
same-sex marriage, and that they very well may use Reynolds v.
United States as a precedent. However, if the court decides to legalize same-sex marriage, polygamy ought to, of necessity, be legalized
as well. They are twin issues, and any legal decision concerning one
will have ramifications for the other.

45
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